The table suggests a strong trend toward increasing supply chain linkages between ICT services and key infrastructure services as evidenced by the increase in such expenditures by over 27 percent in the 2008-2014 period. Household expenditures for ICT services have increased nearly 23 percent in the same period. Using interindustry expenditure data, it is evident that expenditures for ICT services are growing at a much greater rate than the economy as a whole. For example, US real GDP for the same period grew just 13.7 percent. Further, expenditures as a proportion of each industry's production inputs (input fractions) are showing growing importance relative to all other production inputs for these industries.
The report discusses several important findings including the following:
1. The ICT services industry has been and continues to grow steadily, significantly outpacing the economy as a whole. Over the 6-year period covered, industry expenditures on ICT technology grew by double the rate of growth in GDP as a whole (over 27% growth compared just under 14% growth in GDP).
2. Key infrastructure services (e.g. air travel, freight transport, electricity and natural gas distribution, financial services, and critical health care, among others) make over $100 billion in expenditures for these services -this is a major industry in its own right.
3. The key sectors are continuing to strengthen their supply chain linkages to the ICT services industry at the relative expense of other inputs to production.
4. Households purchase nearly 10 times more ICT services than the key infrastructure sectors purchase -primarily for wired and wireless communications services (e.g. phone service, cable and satellite TV, and internet services.
5. Network convergence is a two-edge sword. It is necessary to continue to harvest economic and performance efficiencies from key sectors. However, the connected system is more vulnerable to the unintended or uncontemplated consequences brought about by technology failure or human error in a specific domain of the system.
6. As a result of the growing interdependencies between ICT, electric generation, and distribution, the risk of cascading failures from unforeseen events such as natural disasters, human error, cyber-attacks, or cascading technical failures can create larger and larger negative impacts as network technologies become more tightly linked and interdependent with the key services highlighted in this study.
7. Even with ever-progressing network convergence, ICT Services are inherently resilient by design, as evidenced in the relatively light disruption and quick recovery of networked systems after Hurricane Katrina, for example. As such, they are able to survive catastrophic events, realizing less damage than other fixed infrastructure.
8. As the economic and physical importance of the ICT service industry increases, so does the need for reliable and resilient electric grid services. ICT services themselves represent a significant input to providing a more reliable grid.
This research effort is the result of a short-turnaround DOE request for information. It relies upon information and data found to be readily available from public access sources. Methods employed to develop the paper were necessarily limited in time and effort to meet the request. For example, the report includes direct quotes and graphics developed as original content for existing literature reviewed by PNNL, but which are reproduced here, with citations, in the name of expedience. Due to the nature of this research effort, other approaches including simulation and modeling might be warranted and likely would result in additional refinement of estimates and conclusions presented in this report.
Background
This paper examines the characteristics of information and communications technologies (ICT) and related services on key sectors of the economy having increasing reliance on ICT services. For the purposes of this paper, we define the ICT sector as a set of 6-digit NAICS industries which include important services reliant upon specific technologies to provide their services. Specifically, our definition encompasses critical services and technologies related to enterprise information and communication, continuation of service/disaster recovery, and data backup and restoration. Table 1 summarizes the classification of services we are defining as the ICT industry for this paper. This classification is not inconsistent with other very similar approaches in the literature.  How has the reliance on ICT services evolved in recent years for key infrastructure services such as air travel, freight transport, electricity and natural gas distribution, financial services, and critical health care?
 What ICT industry trends explain continued strong linkage to and reliance upon ICT?
 What is the ICT industry's reliance on grid-supplied power, uninterruptible power supplies, and back-up energy storage technologies?
 What are the observed direct effects of ICT disruptions induced by electrical system failures in recent history and how resilient are the components of the ICT industry?
 How has the use of digital communications evolved through the past 100 years?
This report focusses in two areas. First, it documents the economic reliance or dependence upon ICT services of key sectors of the larger economy subject to immediate significant disruption if electrical service is lost. For this report, those key sectors include air travel, freight transport, electricity and natural gas distribution, financial services, and critical health care.
Other industries are also dependent on ICT services and vulnerable to significant disruption if electrical service is lost unexpectedly, but we have limited the scope of this effort to just those industries mentioned to be responsive to the DOE request for information. Second, it explains this reliance on the ICT service industry in terms of size and importance of key technologies, such as data centers, uninterruptible power supply, and backup energy storage. It presents important trends identified as contributors to the evolving economic reliance on ICT services.
Evolution of ICT Technologies
ICT has come a long way since human beings started speaking and writing. From the earliest forms of speech, the elementary use of pictures and symbols we have grown, matured, and evolved into a place where today advanced communications technologies that enable instantaneous global exchanges of information are absolutely fundamental to not only the health and economic well-being of nations on the planet, but is now equally essential to individual citizens. The global, national, regional, and community infrastructures we depend on including; electricity, water, fuel, food, communications, and transportation all heavily depend on reliable ICT.
Figures 1 and 2 (on the next page) depict the supply chain relationships for key components of the ICT services sector . Supply chains refer to the economic and physical linkages that one industry has with its supplying industries or production inputs. For example, telecommunications providers are linked through their purchases of inputs needed to operate the communication transmission system, related data centers, and the materials and labor needed to keep such facilities in operation. Such inputs include the purchase of electricity and cooling water, fuel for backup power generation, technical software development and 1 https://sftool.gov/Content/attachments/GSA%20Climate%20Risks%20Study%20for%20Telecommunications%20a nd%20Data%20Center%20Services%20-%20FINAL%20October%202014.pdf maintenance, and monitoring services by expert technical staff. The supply chain for data centers includes maintenance and operations of individual server farm site buildings, including facility cooling technologies, backup power generation equipment and uninterruptible power supplies, specialized software development and maintenance, in addition to infrastructure requirements like electricity, water, and fuel for backup power generation. 
Linkage of ICT Services and Electricity
As ICT services have matured and become more ubiquitous throughout the economy, and as economic linkages to these services have grown stronger, the grid services needed to enable the provision of ICT services have received increased attention. Reliable and resilient electricity service is essential to enabling the provision of ICT services. As all significant commerce is carried out on networked systems, these enterprises rely upon data centers for archival record storage, real-time database processing operations, and electronic bandwidth to carry out commerce online. Those services need to have contingencies for potential disruptions in the electrical supply, whether momentary or prolonged. ICT services deploy back-up power supply generators, and electricity storage technologies, in addition to uninterruptible power supply (UPS) technologies to mitigate outages or recover from outages induced by other external events.
This report highlights these linkages between the ICT sector and the electricity sector. Reliance is not just the economic reliance alluded to above, but the physical reliance implied by increasing system convergence. As economic supply chains demonstrate the increased use of ICT services by key industries and the household sector, those industries become more strongly linked physically. Economic metrics allow us to characterize those linkages quantitatively, but those physical linkages also are identified and demonstrated when disruptions occur.
As discussed below, outages of ICT services from non-grid related issues are common but do not often impact grid operations. Data center outages have the potential to cause grid failures and these are generally caused by equipment failures within the data centers. Cyber attacks are one source for non-equipment failures of current concern. Suspected cyber attacks have been happening over the last 15 years in the US, even though there are only 15 listed in the DOE Electric Disturbance Events Annual Summaries Europe with its dense infrastructure and interconnected complex energy systems has started to consider the criticality of intertwined network infrastructures to vulnerability and risk. 
Reliance on ICT by Key Industries
Key industry sectors rely upon ICT services and this reliance has been increasing steadily and markedly in recent years. (2010, 2016) interindustry database. That source also provides several other economic metrics including industry output, the input fractions of each input to production, and others. Economic reliance is determined by examining the input fractions of the supplier industries contributing to the output of the purchasing industry. In this case, we are analyzing the purchasing of ICT services for the provision of air transportation, banking and finance, hospitals, etc. Seeing how these input fractions are changing over time provides some evidence of increasing or decreasing reliance on ICT services by these key industries.
Although the IMPLAN data are more disaggregated than most publicly available data sources, they are still too aggregated to resolve to very finely specified services like disaster recovery, offsite data storage and backup, or data center facilities, for example. Thus, interpretation of the changes between 2008 and 2014 require informed judgment and caution. In addition, given the time limitations of this study, we used data products that were readily available to us from previous related work (2008 and 2014 vintages) . The comparison of these years in absolute constant dollar terms may be affected by general economic conditions in 2008 at the onset of a significant recession. However, the relative comparison of input fractions or proportions should not be overly affected by the years selected to analyze.
With these considerations in mind, there are a few observations to discuss. In real terms, these key industry sectors have increased their annual purchases of ICT services by over $21 billion since 2008, growing by an average of more than 3 percent annually. Over half of this growth has occurred in the financial services sector, which is attributable to that sector's size, relative to the other sectors analyzed. In aggregate, expenditures for ICT services by these key industries have increased from over $80 billion in 2008 to well over $100 billion as of 2014.
The annual growth rates vary widely between industries, which may suggest some (e.g. natural gas distribution, water transportation, warehousing, and hospitals) are investing in ICT services at a greater pace than the other industries. There are many potential reasons for why these variation exist including: reducing costs, providing greater customer service, and expanding revenue channels (Researchmoz Global Pvt Ltd , 2016) . words, the input fraction is the proportion of ICT expenditures relative to the industry's total output. In many cases, the industries studied are becoming significantly more reliant on ICT services, though some have shown decreased reliance between 2008 and 2014. This reliance, indicated by changing input proportions for ICT services, is growing on average by over 3 percent in real terms annually across all industries studied. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the ICT services industry and examines the trends that account for the increasing reliance observed over the past 8 years. Table 2 . Key Industry Reliance on ICT Services (2008 and 2014)*. Reliance is indicated by the magnitude of expenditures made for ICT services as inputs to the production in other key industries and by the increase in these expenditures as a proportion of all production inputs (input fraction). Additional detail for subcomponents of ICT services appears in the Appendix. (IMPLAN 2010 (IMPLAN , 2016 1 Total production including the aggregate cost of all inputs plus value added (labor, taxes, owners' investment, etc.) 2 Purchased inputs of ICT services as a fraction of total output. 3 Relative change in the proportion of ICT services used as production inputs for these industries. * Data for 2008 and 2014 were readily available for this study. Additional data could not be acquired and analyzed in the time allotted.
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ICT Services Industry Data and Trends
Services provided by information and communication technologies are now critical to most enterprises in the economy. As the technologies used by ICT services industry have matured over time, dependence on them to make business operations increasingly efficient has grown significantly. This report focuses on trends observed for data centers, uninterruptible power supplies, and back-up electricity storage. Current market research suggests that strong growth in the deployment of these services and the related technologies will continue to be strong for the foreseeable future. The trends are driven by falling costs of the underlying technologies. As adoption grows, more suppliers enter the market -driving down costs.
Data Center Market
Over the last decade, there has been a steady shift from company operated data centers to cloud computing. A recent survey 7 of senior IT executives confirmed that at least half of all work processes will shift to the cloud by 2020. This shift is driven by improved efficiency and cost effectiveness of cloud-based systems compared to company-owned facilities, in addition to the need for increased reliability and security of the stored data. The major players in this area are Amazon Web Services, Google, IBM, and Microsoft. Data center growth is shown by the growth in cloud-based systems. As data center use grows either for company specific use or cloud use to a wide range of endusers, the consequent requirements for additional uninterruptible power supply and backup generators will grow in parallel, because of the need to allow reliable continuous operation in the face of short-term, less than 24 hour, grid outages. The focus by data center operators and utilities supplying power to them has been on efficient energy use, which includes uninterruptible power supply efficiency to meet Energy Star standards. Utilities such as PG&E in California have recommendations for maximizing energy efficiency and as well as uninterruptible power supply efficiency 9 .
Data center backup systems planning 10 includes the proper configuration of generator units and uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems. In a generation system, every available generator unit can be programmed to start automatically during a loss of utility power. As long as sufficient fuel is available, the generators power the entire data center load until the utility power source is restored.
When regular power is restored, the generators transfer the load back to the utility and stop operating. The transition to and from the backup-generator power is seamless, when configured properly. The most effective designs will incorporate the necessary generators to supply power, as well as backup generators, should any one unit fail.
Redundancy should also be built into the UPS system so that one failing module won't affect the overall capacity of the system. Both generator and UPS systems can be configured for automatic and manual power transfer. Automatic transfer is critical during unexpected outages. Manual transfers are used for scheduled maintenance and testing of data center equipment and procedures without interfering with normal operations.
End-Use Electric Storage Market
The emergence of behind-the-meter energy storage is apparent in market research reported by Cleantechnica The use of energy storage for power system reliability in commercial buildings or data centers either for basic infrastructure operations and data center power reliability is indicated in the nonresidential bars in Figure 4 below. One concept that has validity is the use of both energy storage and backup generation being used in demand response programs to use in place infrastructure components to generate revenues from the supplying utility 12 . 9 http://www.pge.com/includes/docs/pdfs/mybusiness/energysavingsrebates/incentivesbyindustry/DataCenters_B estPractices.pdf 10 http://www.datacenterjournal.com/reliability-redundancy-understanding-high-availability-data-center/ 11 https://cleantechnica.com/2015/12/09/falling-costs-rising-applications-will-boost-us-energy-storage-market/ 12 http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/content-tracks/power-cooling/cutting-data-center-energy-demand-for-aprofit/96307.fullarticle 13 The figure suggests that electricity storage as a component of commercial and residential sector back-up and supplemental power resources is growing and gaining market share relative to utility scale electricity storage.
Uninterruptible Power Supply Market
Trends in this market follow trends in the data center market, as these technologies are critical to the operation of data centers. Recent market research by Grand View Research 14 suggests the trends indicated in Figure 5 .
As implementation of cloud computing continues to grow, along with the need for sensitive and ubiquitous data, data center UPS installations are projected to follow that trend. Increased adoption of mobile computing services, online services, and remote access services also continue to bolster the industry. Other factors boosting the data center UPS market growth are increased adoption of Software as a Service (SaaS), high-performance computing, online gaming, and online media streaming. The use of portable UPS systems has gained prominence, which is further expected to boost data center UPS market growth. US segmentation of the data from this source is not publicly available. The clear trend in increased deployment of small data centers suggests that smaller and smaller enterprises are becoming more and more reliant upon enterprise data back-up solutions.
13 https://cleantechnica.com/2015/12/09/falling-costs-rising-applications-will-boost-us-energy-storage-market/ 14 http://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/data-center-ups-market Figure 5 . 2012 -2020 Global data center UPS market by product, ($MM) (Source: Grand View Research, 2014). This chart is from an abstract of a commercially available industry report suggesting that while the UPS market segments for medium and large data centers are projected to grow slightly through 2020, substantial growth is expected in the small data center market for UPS equipment. This indicates that smaller and smaller enterprises are requiring data center services and becoming reliant upon them.
ICT Services and Grid Power
Automation in the electric grid system began with the need to limit short circuits by protecting equipment with fuses and electromechanical relays. At the distribution level prior to the 1940s, outage repair was based on replacing blown fuses and repairing downed lines with manual labor. The initial use of the automated distribution "re-closer" in the 1940s, which relied on basic sensors and timers, began the march to more reliability, lower labor costs, and faster outage resolution.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems based on sensors and digital communication networks came into use in the late 1970s allowing both the display of grid information in control centers and remote operation of circuit breakers and other devices in substations that were previously manned. As digital relays were developed using microprocessors, faster control speeds required improved communication systems speeds. This has been true at both the transmission and distribution level.
Communications systems for grid control evolved from powerline carrier (very slow data rates) to analog microwave channels, then digital microwave channels and onto fiber-optic cables either buried in right-of-way or attached to ground or conductor wires. The original microwave channels were utility owned and operated. When the shift to fiber optics happened, utilities began sharing expenses and right-of-way with commercial communications companies to install fiber optics. Particularly at the distribution level, communications companies would install fiber and utilities would then take advantage of in-place infrastructure for high-speed communications to improve grid automation. This evolution of power and communications has grown both physically in the same right-of-way as well as been intermixed from communications and control standpoint. This has become the basis for the smart grid concept, which the DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability defines as "a grid that uses digital technology to improve reliability, resiliency, flexibility, and efficiency (both economic and energy) of the electric delivery system".
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The reality of current day and projected future grid interactions with end-use power and ICT are well-defined in how to enable the benefits of the power grid in coordination with communications in a "Buildings to Grid Technical Opportunities" perspective paper 
Effects of Power Outages on ICT
Electricity is essential to providing ICT services which impact almost all Americans daily lives either for communications, entertainment or to transact incoming or outgoing business operations. The reliability of power in the form of grid power, uninterruptible power supplies, energy storage or backup generation to keep society functioning is essential.
The technologies that form the backbone of ICT services depend upon reliable electric service to function. Routers depend on communications circuits, such as leased lines, local area networks, microwave, fiber optic, and satellite links, to connect to neighboring routers and networks. Most of these links are operated by communications common carriers that are usually not the same organizations that run the routers. These links may fail or go out of service periodically because of technical problems, cable cuts, or other issues beyond the control of router operators. An outage in a communications carrier's core network may not affect Internet routing very much, as the carrier would most likely have other routes available to which the traffic could be switched. An outage in the "last mile" of a circuit serving a router facility may cause a connectivity problem, because there may be no alternate path to the Internet until the circuit is fixed (DHS, 2011) 17 .
Whenever there are large grid outages, communications systems can be disrupted because power lines go down, emergency generators go on at telephone switch offices, cellular sites, internet switching centers as well as business data centers large and small. When the power cannot be restored in eight hours or less, generators at cellular sites run out of fuel and stop working. This causes a disruption to emergency services that rely on mobile communication systems based on cellular technology as well as emergency services from ambulance to police.
If the power is out for more than 24 hours, disruptions to central telephone office switches, hospitals and other emergency services are often disrupted because fuel supplies for these services are generally only good for 24 hours of run time. When there are downed power poles, trees or flooding, the ability to deliver fuel to keep these generators running or restart them can cause tremendous suffering and threaten lives. Other additional community services such as water, sewer and emergency services are put at risk.
Electric Reliability and Resilience
Outage impacts are typically measured based on industry-standard metrics such as System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) and System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) 18 . Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the recent commercial sector trends in these metrics. Trends suggest general improvement (e.g., duration and frequency of outages are declining). However, these metrics do not account for the accompanying economic impacts of the associated outages, and there is currently no metric that provides such information in a standardized way. Harmonization of SAIDI data was not done until the 1990s and began in the 1980s because of the advent of digital devices (clocks) which would "blink" when momentary power outages cause them to reset. 19 attempted to identify statistical evidence for increasing or decreasing reliability of the US electrical system. They studied data collected from 195 utilities on frequency and duration of outages over the 2000-2012 period. They concluded that no trend exists for increasing frequency of outages whether the outages are weather-related or not. They did identify statistically significant trends for increasing duration of outages over that period, both for weather related and non-weather related outages over that period. The conclusions regarding outage duration are consistent with the incidence of more frequent severe disasters, which tend to cause outages of longer duration. The LBNL conclusions would seem to differ somewhat from a visual inspection of Figures 6 and 7, but their analysis covers a longer time series and makes several important adjustments to the reported utility data. Thus, the best data would suggest that frequency of outages is essentially flat, but that duration (and associated economic impact) is increasing.
Resilience is an important concept that builds on reliability and for which widely accepted metrics have yet to be developed or reported. It is the notion of how well can the system recover from, adapt to, or avoid external (e.g. outage-causing) events. Data centers, cellular data equipment, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are all dependent upon commercial power from local utilities for operation. Each of these has a limited capability/requirement for backup power generation, generally in the 8 to 24 hour range, based on batteries -UPSenergy storage, fuel cells, or generator sets. Disasters such major storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes or wildfires affect the reliability of the electricity grid, which in turn affects the reliability of networked communications. Even with the well-documented severity of hurricane Katrina, network outages generally stayed below 10 percent, except in Mississippi, where they stayed below 25 percent, except for a peak outage period of about 35 percent. However, the severity of hurricane Katrina contributed to the long duration of network outages across the affected path, reflected by the slow restoration of network services due to other infrastructure damage.
Disruptions of data center activities in many cases stem from failure in backup systems that typically only trip in cases of grid instability.
21 Figure 9 illustrates the root causes of data center outages. Figure 10 illustrates the average cost impacts across a study of 63 data centers. UPS system failure, weather related events, and generator failure account for over 40% of unplanned data center outages thus far in 2016. Power failure or other electrical issues would be the typical reason for these systems to engage in the first place. "The very largest provider networks (the Internet backbones) were reportedly unaffected by the blackout, but thousands of corporate and other institutional networks and millions of individual Internet users were offline for hours or days. Banks, investment funds, business services, manufacturers, hospitals, internet service providers, and federal and state government units were among the affected organizations." Figure 11 illustrates recent trends in the number of billion-dollar disasters. The economic damage from these storms is correlated with the severity of lost services, such as electricity service. This also supports the LBNL finding above that there is an increasing trend on outage duration over the 2000-2012 period. . These events included 2 flooding events and 6 severe storm events. Overall, these events resulted in the deaths of 30 people and had significant economic effects on the areas impacted. Figure 12 illustrates the root causes of business interruption 26 from natural disasters. Over 70% of business disruption from natural disasters is due to power outages. This listing of Internet failures includes Amazon's major 2013 Eastern region failure, the failure in 17 states by Xerox's electronic benefit system for food stamps, short complete outages of Google, and a number of other software and hardware failures. These failures make the point that "The more we rely on technology, the more devastating it is when there's a network or systems failure." "More serious outages cause business disruptions, which can result in reduced productivity, damage to reputation, breaches in security, and lost revenue. According to network services company MegaPath, the average cost of downtime equates to $212,200 per hour --a figure that can skyrocket for web-and network-based businesses. In August, the Amazon.com website went down for a period of 30 to 40 minutes, costing the company between $3 and $4 million."
ICT Outages and Service Impacts to Key Industries
Most ICT service disruptions are not grid-related, as illustrated previously. Failure of key ICT equipment such as network servers and routers, uninterruptible power supplies, and back-up power technologies are the greatest cause of ICT service disruption. This section characterizes these areas of potential risk to industries that are heavily reliant upon them.
Wireless and Wired Communications
As wireless communications technology has improved and proliferated, more and more enterprises have migrated and continue migrating away from wired phone lines for communications. This is calling into question the nation's dependence on somewhat less reliable wires technologies. For example, there is a regulatory movement underway to force wireless providers to offer some form of back-up power to their customers' wireless services to mitigate the outage times encountered in any one year. Importance of cellular communication systems during a grid outage cannot be overestimated because of the reliance of emergency services use of cellular voice and data (ICT services) during disasters.
FCC backup telecommunication power requirement
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: requires that providers should maintain emergency backup power for a minimum of 24 hours for assets inside central offices and eight hours for cell sites. FCC's industry-based advisory group, the Communication Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council working group 9 subcommittee for backup power cell sites, recommends details for backup power requirements in their 2014 document 29 . This industry working group has recommended that the details of their document be shared with NIST which has prepared a Community Disaster Resilience Framework 30 , which, in turn, includes both energy and communications sections, in addition to a wide range of other issues covered.
Industry stakeholders argue the need for backup power rules for phone lines 31 : "As consumers transition from legacy copper loops to new technologies, it is important they continue to have reasonable CPE [customer premises equipment] backup power alternatives to support minimally essential residential communications, particularly access to emergency communications, during power outages," the FCC said.
The commission tentatively proposed requiring that service providers "assume responsibility for provisioning backup power that is capable of powering their customers' CPE during the first eight hours of an outage." However, the FCC said it would consider a 24-hour requirement and noted that Verizon already offers a 24-hour backup device.
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Not surprisingly, voice providers don't want to face any new requirements. They argue that consumers have willingly switched from copper landlines to VoIP service despite carriers being required to inform customers of the power limitations. Customers are also increasingly using cellular service instead of landlines to make voice calls, they note. The Wall Street Journal covered major technology outages in July 2015. The article pointed out the strengths of the plain old telephone system (POTS) when it was run by the Bell telephone system under regulation and compares it to the current Internetbased communications which is prone to failure because of low cost components and a lack of maintenance. The quotes below emphasize these points. 
"Say what you will about Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS), but it worked. The functionality of POTS, as it was known
Internet Service
A recent PNNL study 35 concluded that the recent trends in the utility industry suggest an even tighter coupling of interdependence between electric and ICT infrastructure networks in coming years. While cyber vulnerability must remain a focus of federal research, development, and information-sharing efforts with industry, the convergence of these networks also holds substantial promise as a platform for energy innovation, leading to potential new value streams and enhanced system resilience.
Electricity and Gas Distribution Services
The PNNL study 36 also suggests that the convergence of electricity and ICT networks holds promise as a key element of a platform for energy innovation, leading to potential new value streams and enhanced system resilience. The pace at which this convergence (see Figure  13 37 ) occurs and new services and operational methods emerge, will depend on a number of factors, including regulatory structures that set the framework within which utilities and grid operators prioritize infrastructure investment decisions. As convergence increases, the risk increases that unintended consequences of failure in one domain of the converging system will affect all the others, similar to the web convergence example above.
One example of the convergence of the electric system and natural gas supply for electrical generation was the polar vortex event of 2013. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation reported on this near miss which even though only 300 MW of load was dropped, was categorized as a category five event that could have caused the loss of more than 10,000
35 http://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-24643.pdf 36 http://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-24643.pdf 37 http://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-24152.pdf
MW of generation
38
. This report contained recommendations on how to improve the reliability situation and the PJM market changes to their bidding rules to decrease the likelihood of problems in the future. Some of the key recommendations included 32 :  Examine and review the natural gas supply issues encountered during the event.
Industry should also work with gas suppliers, markets, and regulators to quickly identify issues with natural gas supply and transportation so that appropriate actions can be developed and implemented to allow generators to be able to secure firm supply and transportation at a reasonable rate.
 Continue to improve operations management awareness of the fuel status of all generators, including improved awareness of pipeline system conditions. This might include a daily fuel inventory solicitation process, ability to dispatch plants early in anticipation of extreme winter weather, and increased communication channels with electric and gas industries during extreme events.
 Industry should review internal processes to ensure they are ready to take proactive actions to secure the waivers (market, environmental, fuel, etc.) from the appropriate entities. For example, PJM requested waivers of certain provisions of PJM's governing documents that would permit them to share certain nonpublic information with natural gas pipeline operators during the forecasted extreme weather conditions. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission responded promptly to PJM's filing, which enabled those communications to commence quickly. Figure 13 . Network Convergence in the Electricity and Gas Industries (Source: PNNL-24152 39 ). Convergence refers to the tightening of intersectoral linkages made possible by ever-improving ICT services. These tight linkages require ever more reliable and resilient power infrastructure to ensure against cascading failure from disruption in one sector tripping additional disruption in connected sectors.
http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/January%202014%20Polar%20Vortex%20Review/Polar_Vortex_Review_29_Sept_2 014_Final.pdf executive summary page iii 39 http://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-24152.pdf
Cloud Data Services
Cloud-scale data centers handle the data storage and back-up services for potentially thousands of enterprises. Many cloud service data centers today may be identified as mega data centers, having on the order of tens of thousands or more servers, drawing tens of MW of power at peak. Massive data analysis applications (e.g., computing the web search index) are a natural fit for a mega data center, where some problems require huge amounts of fast random access memory, others require massive numbers of central processing unit cycles, and still others require massive disk Input/Output band-width. Such cases point out emerging realities of the impact of network failures on global commerce. Network and data center outages are the unavoidable for everybody who does business on the internet. All systems go down at some point in time, and while most customers recognize this as reality, service providers during outages are judged based on the speed of recovery and transparency.
Case Study: Telia Outage
ICT System Risk
A risk of principal concern identified in a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) baseline assessment 41 for the Internet Routing function is that a natural disaster or a manmade incident could destroy or disable a data center or telecommunications facility that houses a number of routers. A natural disaster may also damage or disable power and communications lines at or near the router facility, which could leave the routers intact, but leave them without a way to communicate with the Internet. The majority of internet and other communications outages involve isolated equipment failures, communications circuit outages, or faulty routing announcements. In the event of a natural disaster or a terrorist attack, restoring Internet routing operations may be hampered by problems accessing the routing facility, physical damage to communications lines, or getting replacement hardware, software, or routing updates.
The routers that provide an organization with connectivity to the Internet may be housed in a data center or in a telecommunications facility. Locating critical communications equipment such as routers and web servers in a number of geographically dispersed locations, and establishing processes and procedures for other locations to act as fail-over and backup operations sites, are well-established principles in data communications and telecommunications operations. These practices are fundamental elements of the resilience of the IT Sector.
The major Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), major hubs for routing Internet traffic that concentrate Internet routing and communications facilities for ISPs and carriers, can be particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, and electric power and communication outages. An IXP may have a number of local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or Internet backbone carriers co-located to exchange Internet traffic. An IXP puts routers from a number of local, regional, and backbone carriers in the same building, where they can exchange traffic directly, instead of being in separate locations connected by high-speed communications lines.
Within the IXP, the routers can send traffic to other carriers or ISPs over high-speed local area network or direct links, avoiding the expense and potential delay of routing traffic through other parts of the Internet. The IXPs are frequently located in or near big cities, where they concentrate traffic originating from local ISPs across high-speed links to other parts of the Internet. IXPs in Europe, for example, may send traffic destined for web sites in North America directly across the Atlantic to another IXP on the East Coast, where it is re-directed to other IXPs or ISPs for delivery to its destinations.
IXP operators take many of the same precautions as data center operators to reduce their vulnerabilities. They usually have emergency power supplies and communications redundancy and diversity, and take other measures to ensure continuous operations.
The likelihood of an incident that would destroy or impair the operation of a major routing center may be fairly low, but the concentration of routing facilities in relatively few major routing centers does increase their vulnerability, as discussed in the next section.
ICT Disaster Recovery
The ICT networked systems and services are inherently resilient by design. The systems are designed to take advantage of the properties of networks to re-route communications around trouble spots. Service providers and carriers can recover from internet outages more quickly and with fewer problems if they have comprehensive recovery plans in place. Most reputable organizations have recovery plans, but the risk is whether those plans incorporate recovery processes for recent software updates or changes that have been made in the network or its services, such as new communications pathway recovery options. Another risk to recovery planning is the extent to which recovery plans have been tested. Testing uncovers deficiencies in plans, processes, and procedures, but running full-scale tests of those plans takes time, money, and resources that some organizations may not be willing or able to commit.
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In our interconnected, networked world, Internet access is indispensable. Alternative power source options during Very Large Scale Events are essential. Vital facilities such as cell towers and critical data centers need to have power restored before their backup generators run out of fuel, or further restoration and emergency services efforts will be compromised. Recommendation: Electric utilities, infrastructure providers, and local communities need to work more closely together to define and update critical customer and infrastructure demands to minimize societal impacts.
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42 https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/itsrm-for-internet-routing-report.pdf 43 https://www.naseo.org/Data/Sites/1/documents/committees/energysecurity/documents/gridwise-superstormsandy-workshop-report.pdf
Discussion and Conclusions
This report illustrates several important considerations for understanding and analyzing the ICT services industry.
1. The ICT services industry has been and continues to grow steadily, significantly outpacing the economy as a whole.
2. Key infrastructure services (e.g. air travel, freight transport, electricity and natural gas distribution, financial services, and critical health care, among others) make substantial expenditures for these services -this is a major industry in its own right.
4. Households purchase nearly 10 times the ICT services that the key infrastructure services purchase -primarily for wired and wireless communication services (e.g. phone service, cable and satellite TV, and internet services.
5. As the economic and physical importance of the ICT service industry increases, so does the need for reliable and resilient electric grid services.
6. Network convergence is a two-edge sword. It is necessary to continue to harvest economic and performance efficiencies from individual industries. However, the connected system is more vulnerable to the unintended or uncontemplated consequences brought about by technology failure or human error in a specific domain of the system. 7. Unforeseen events such as natural disasters, human error, or cascading technical failures will wreak larger and larger negative impacts as network technologies become more tightly linked and interdependent with the key services highlighted in this study.
8. Even with ever-progressing network convergence, ICT Services are inherently resilient by design. As such, they are able to survive catastrophic events, realizing less damage than other fixed infrastructure. Source: Derived from IMPLAN Database (IMPLAN 2010 (IMPLAN , 2016 1 Total production including the aggregate cost of all inputs plus value added (labor, taxes, owners' investment, etc.) 2 Purchased inputs of ICT services as a fraction of total output. 3 Relative change in the proportion of ICT services used as production inputs for these industries. * Data for 2008 and 2014 were readily available for this study. Additional data could not be acquired and analyzed in the time allotted
